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Abstract
This paper examines the current state of border hardening against refugees in the
European Union and Australia through the lens of state crime. Border hardening
strategies are described for both of these areas and a theoretical basis of state crime
victimology is used to examine the refugees who encounter this border hardening. The
present study analyzes two data sets on border deaths, one for the European Union and
one for Australia, to examine the demographics of the refugees who perish while
attempting to transgress the border. Results indicated that there remains a significant
amount of missing data, suggesting that official methods of record-keeping are necessary
to determine the most basic demographics, such as gender and age, so analyses can be
run to determine significance in this area. One clear finding was that migrants most
frequently die from drowning (EU: 83.6%; AU: 93%) compared to any other cause. Also,
there is indication that those from disadvantaged areas of origin (such as the Middle East
and Africa) are more likely to die in the borderlands than others in the dataset. Practical
implications of the findings are discussed along with suggestions for future research.
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This work is dedicated to the refugees whose deaths so often remain unknown and
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to convince governments of the importance of refugee protection and the consequences of
border hardening.
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Chapter One: Introduction
White collar crime is unquestionably underrepresented in criminological and
criminal justice literature (Wright & Friedrichs, 1991; Cullen & Benson, 1993; Tunnel,
1993; Wright, 2000; Lynch, McGurrin, & Fenwick, 2004; Rothe & Ross, 2008; Shichor,
2008). This is the case even though white collar crime causes greater loss of life, more
injuries and illnesses, and larger economic losses than all traditional street crimes
combined (Moore & Mills 1990; Lynch et al. 2004). State crime is no exception to this
fact. Although it is estimated that more than 60 million people died in the 20th century
due to direct actions of states around the world, state crime has been studied less than
corporate or occupational crime (Friedrichs, 2010). State crime refers to the harmful
undertaking by an agency or the state as a whole. Green and Ward (2000) define state
crime as deviance by the state that violates human rights in the pursuit of organizational
goals. Another definition focuses on the action by the state that violates international or
domestic law on its own behalf or in the name of the state (Mullins & Roethe, 2007).
State crime comes in several forms, including corruption, repression, and violence
towards citizens (Friedrichs, 2010). Green and Grewcock (2002) further describe it as a
kind of legal entitlement for governmental administrations to behave in ways that if done
by an individual would be considered violent, harsh, and against basic human rights.
State-organized crime, in particular, utilizes laws and the pursuit of these laws to cause
harm to people (Friedrichs, 2010). For example, both the European Union and Australia
have put into place multiple policies that have hindered those who cross borders in an
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irregular fashion from receiving proper access to claiming refugee status, holding them
for undetermined amounts of time in unsafe conditions, and creating situations that may
endanger lives.
Migrants attempt to enter a new land for a myriad of reasons. Some are voluntary
reasons, such as a better job, healthcare, or more freedoms. On the other hand there are
individuals, known as refugees, who migrate for involuntary reasons, such as fleeing a
more serious problem in their homeland. This paper is focused on those people who cross
borders irregularly. Since it is difficult to know the legal status of migrants who may be
barred from a chance to file for status, one must look to those people generally who enter
irregularly, often smuggled in by boat or truck (Pickering, 2004). Many of these
individuals come from areas riddled with war, oppression, and conflict (Castles &
Loughna, 2003; Hatton & Williamson, 2006). However, whether or not they are a refugee
or another type of migrant, border hardening may be putting them at risk of injury or
death. Due to this complication and in order to focus on the issues rather than
terminology, Green and Grewcock’s (2003) definition of refugee is used. This definition
is stated as any individual who is seeking refuge in a country. This is distinct from the
UNHCR’s legal definition of refugee as someone who has been granted asylum under the
1951 Refugee Convention.
Historically Australia and the EU ensured specific rights to refugees by signing
the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as the 1967 Protocol. The Convention guarantees
the rights of refugees in international law, and the main rights allotted to refugees are
2

those of non-refoulement (otherwise known as not returning someone to a country where
he/she might be persecuted) and non-discrimination. However, in recent years, both
regions seem to have taken evasive action from the promise to protect and accept these
migrants into safe conditions through restrictive refugee policies. Such actions may have
resulted from policies adopted under the guise of human rights to protect victims of
trafficking and create a safe state in opposition to terrorism. Indeed, both states have
funneled funds and labor into creating a militarized and impenetrable border (Green &
Grewcock, 2002; Pickering, 2004; Weber, 2007). Several authors have argued that this
militarization and increase in border patrol has not seen a reduction in migration (Nevins,
2003; Purcell & Nevins, 2005).
Authors have argued that this border hardening around the world has an adverse
effect on the migrants trying to transverse this line (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Carter &
Merrill, 2007; Green & Grewcock, 2002; Kim, 2007; Nevins, 2003; Pickering, 2005;
Purcell & Nevins, 2005; Scarpellino, 2007; Weber, 2007). Of those authors, only a few
have framed their arguments through the lens of state crime or structural violence (Green
& Grewcock, 2002; Nevins, 2003; Pickering, 2005; Scarpellino, 2007; Weber, 2007).
These studies have illuminated the links between organized trafficking, refugees, and
state crime (Green & Grewcock, 2002), structural violence and deaths along the border in
the United States (Nevins, 2003), refugees framed as criminals by the regulatory state in
Australia (Pickering, 2005), and a systematic violation of human rights by border
hardening in the US and the EU (Scarpellino, 2007; Weber, 2007). Most of these
3

previous authors investigating this phenomenon have used mainly a natural experiment
approach, observing a real-world situation (border hardening) to look at the harmful
effects that it might cause to migrants bolstered by government documents and media
coverage to examine the issue of state crime and border hardening. None of the studies
have specifically explored the fatalities associated with border hardening, such as the
demographics of the victims, the causes of their deaths, and the locations from which
these migrants come.
The purpose of this study is to examine the history of EU and Australian refugee
policies, examine the role that gender and area of origin play, and explore how these
factors play a role in leading to denial of victims and deaths at the border. Border death
is defined as those persons who die while crossing the border or in the borderlands
attempting to cross the border. Two secondary datasets are used for analyses: one, which
was compiled from data by UNITED1 on EU migrant deaths and another on Australian
border-related deaths used in a 2011 study conducted by Weber and Pickering. For both
datasets, information was gathered from NGOs on individual migrant deaths, including
demographics, cause of deaths, and place of death. It is important to recognize that there
is no official national or regional count of border-related deaths in EU or Australia. These
two data sets are used to explore the demographic characteristics around deaths at or near

1

UNITED is a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that was founded in 1992 that is
located in Amsterdam. It is made up of over 560 NGOs and it is their goal to raise awareness on several
issues including anti-nationalism, anti-racism, anti-fascism, and support of migrants and refugees.

UNITED gathers information, from its partners, on migrant deaths.
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the border with a specific focus on how border hardening may disproportionately affect
women and those from socially disadvantaged areas of origin.
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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
Border hardening is defined in this paper as the culmination of measures,
including symbolic deterrence, civil actions, and military enforcement, to keep out
unwanted migrants (Pickering, 2004). State sovereignty is an important argument in
modern times for the hardening of borders. In this globalizing world, some scholars have
argued the rights of sovereignty to control who enters its borders are declining due to
international human rights regimes (Jacobsen & Lawson, 1999; Sassen, 1996). Although
this argument seems balanced on the surface, it is important to remember that states also
have the responsibility to uphold human rights, as well as protecting their sovereignty.
There are many reasons that people migrate, however refugees are often fleeing a
state of conflict and violence. Weber (2007) argues that deterrence can only be effective
for people who have a choice about their migration. Therefore, the militarization of
borders and the target hardening of easier entry ports is not effective in deterring
migration (Nevins, 2003). However, what border hardening may do instead is increase
the risk for refugees who are trying to enter a country. This trend of border hardening in
Australia is seen most clearly through the lens of the Pacific Solution, when the
Australian government began the initial stages of making its borders more difficult to
cross with the excision of territory in 2001. Territorial islands were excised which meant
that they were no longer considered part of Australia. Edwards (2003) argues that this
was done in order to prevent access to territories that were closer to countries in which
emigrating refugees were arriving by boat. This created a new category of refugees called
6

“offshore entry persons.” If an asylum seeker landed in the new excised zone, he or she
was prohibited from legal proceedings, even to challenge detention (Kneebone, 2006).
Additionally, the unlawful arrivals were unable to apply for a visa (York, 2003).
Similarly, the countries that currently comprise the EU have also hardened its
borders against migrants. Grewcock (2003) argues the 1970s held the infancy of this
border hardening in the EU. In 1975, there was a meeting called the TREVI group
(Terrorism, Radicalism, and Violence International) of twelve representatives from the
European community that focused on security, refugees and a pan-European police force
that would help fight terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and organized crime
(Grewcock, 2003; Green and Grewcock, 2002). The pre-EU policy was known as
European Security Zone. However, it was the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997 that
centrally focused on official border hardening. The Amsterdam Treaty secured the
Schengen Agreement as part of EU law and set an international human rights standard,
including a focus on equal protections and protection against discrimination for within its
borders (Kjaerum, 2002). In the same treaty, the EU announced more protections for its
citizens, it placed strict standards on those outside the borders. By implementing safety
and international zones, carrier sanctions and visa restrictions, Western Europe cut in half
the number of asylum seekers from 692,685 in 1992 to 350,000 by 1998 (Kjaerum,
2002).
Border policing is a substantial part of border hardening. Border policing helps
countries control who goes in and out of its borders, detection of human smuggling
7

activity, and the discovery of illegal drugs and items being smuggled across borders
(Andreas, 2000). However, border policing may also increase the risk for those
attempting to enter the country. Pickering (2004) argues that the Australian Federal
Police’s (AFP) enforcement of the borders only makes border crossing more likely to
result in serious harm and death for refugees, as well as promoting business for organized
crime such as human trafficking. The AFP has narrowed its focus not to pursuing action
against smugglers, but by trying to stop boats of migrants from leaving Indonesia for
Australia (Pickering, 2004).
FRONTEX, from the French, “Frontières extérieures” meaning "external
borders," is the legal name for the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union that
patrols the EU’s borders. It originated in 2005 and began its work in the field in 2006 in
the Canary Islands (Lutterbeck, 2008). FRONTEX’s purpose is EU border security in
conjunction (and often through joint operations) with the member states themselves
(FRONTEX, n.d.). In 2008, FRONTEX had problems with finding qualified staff, and no
base of operations in southern Europe where most people cross the border (Brady, 2008).
The most controversial practice of FRONTEX involves turning away ships to their point
of origin, often with no assessment of possible refugees on board or any consideration to
the seaworthiness of vessels, endangering the lives of people aboard the ships (Rijpma,
2010). Many NGOs consider FRONTEX’s securitization of the borders to be a “war
against migrants.” However, recently FRONTEX partnered with the United Nations High
8

Council on Refugees, a human rights agency, in an attempt to change its image and
policies (Lenoard, 2011).
The threat of terrorism is also closely linked to the border security argument. It is
the duty of the state to protect its citizens from harm and, in order to do this, authors have
discussed how various governments’ securitization around borders is connected with the
need to keep out dangerous terrorists who wish to do harm to those same citizens
(Adamason, 2006; Huysmans, 2000; Salter, 2004; Solana, 2005).While states may
believe that they are effectively increasing the security of the country by policing at the
border, the same states may also be ineffective at achieving justice for a migrant person
(Weber, 2007).
Victims of state-organized crime need to be analyzed in order to understand the
gravity of crimes committed. Ross and Roethe (2008) explain how states use a variety of
practices during their offenses, including censure, scapegoating, retaliation, plausible
deniability, relying on the self-righteousness, misdirection, and fear mongering. All of
these pieces can be seen in the treatment of refugees by the Australian and the EU.
Matthews and Miller (2001) describe five propositions to victimology in regards to state
crime.
First, Matthews and Miller (2001) describe how state crime victims are not
socially powerful and are often stereotyped, giving no recourse against government
“othering.” The refugee issue is a complex one. Governments in the EU and Australia
fear that if the borders are not secured, that the country would be overrun with
9

impoverished individuals who will need state assistance, have low skill levels, and alien
cultures (Basok, 1996; Razin & Wahba, 2011; Xu, 2007). These issues concern
governments and citizens on both a fiduciary and emotional level. However, these fears
must be placed in the context of human rights. Refugees are not socially powerful in
myriad of ways that include factors like coming from disadvantaged countries, being
racially different than the dominant group in the arrival country, and face issues regarding
gender in both the journey and the arrival. Modern-day refugees coming to the EU are
mostly from African and Asian countries (Schuster & Solomos, 1999). The difference of
culture and “civilized” values has often been brought up as a threat to European,
especially British identity by Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, members of
Parliament such as Jaques Arnold, and British Prime Minister Michael Howard (Green, &
Grewcock, 2002; Schuster & Solomos, 1999). From the former Prime Minister, John
Howard to his ministers to other high ranking Australian officials refugees have been
framed as undesirable immigrants (Dyrenfurth, 2005; Colic-Peisker, 2005; Kuhn, 2009).
In the UK, the government used words like “bogus” and “vast hordes” to describe
refugees in the 1990s by members of parliament, including Kenneth Baker, Jaques
Arnold, and Anne Widdecombe (Schuster & Solomon, 1999). This terminology, coupled
with the lumping together of refugees with foreign nationals and economic migrants in
government “white papers” in England and Australia has led to refugees not only being
seen as unwanted, but dangerous (Bosworth & Guild, 2008).
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Similarly, the Australian government passed policies which could block them
from recourse. The Advanced Passenger Processing (APP) network is a system which
relies on risk profiles to look into someone who is applying for a visa. That means the
visas are granted based on national risk profiles which disadvantages those refugees from
countries that are “high risk” (Weber, 2007). This forces those “high risk” individuals
who cannot get a visa to approach Australia in a different manner, such as by boat or
smuggler, which in turn is more dangerous that entering with a valid visa by air.
Bosworth and Guild (2008) argue that immigration measures by governments have a
discriminatory effect on the poorer, the less skilled, and the darker skinned. In 2010, the
Kevin Rudd (Australia’s Prime Minister) government suspended the processing of new
visas from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Immigrants from these two countries are the ones
who most often populate boats that attempt to enter Australia and both are considered
high risk countries (Koser, 2010). Most of the refugees that arrive by boat are Arab or
Persian in descent (Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranians) and Muslim, while those who arrive by
plane are more likely to be Asian or Eastern European (Kuhn, 2009; Pickering 2004).
Pickering (2004) argues the deterring of refugees into Australia is primarily about
discrimination, particularly targeted at those migrants who arrive from the Middle East
and have the Muslim faith.
Several authors have argued that many refugee women are triple disadvantaged
in the realm of migration, because they are discriminated against based on gender, race,
& class (Calavita, 2006; Carling, 2005; Luibheid, 2002; Pittaway & Bartolomei, 2001).
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Pittaway and Bartolomei (2001) argue that racist state policies of host countries result in
the exploitation of refugee women. Women are highly vulnerable to physical and sexual
violence during migration. Lubiheid (2002) states very high numbers of women are
assaulted by border patrol agents, soldiers, and other officials when trying to cross
borders. Most women do not report their experiences, for fear their refugee claims will be
denied or they will be labeled as prostitutes (Pittaway & Bartolomei, 2001).
Matthews and Miller (2001) second proposition of state crime victimology
highlights how the victimizer dehumanizes victims by utilizing specialized vocabularies
and denial to cause harm. The governments in the EU and Australia have used multiple
terms to describe the refugees as different from those who reside within the borders.
There is a whole set of language that is used in reference to refugees. For instance, among
EU refugees, words like illegal arrivals, queue jumpers, poor integrators and possible
terrorists are often attached to them by members of parliament, prime ministers in both
Australia and England, and the EU council of ministers (Dyrenfurth, 2005; Colic-Peisker,
2005; Kuhn, 2009). There have also been cases where political representatives from both
the EU and Australia have denied that actions were causing harm to refugees
(Dryenfurth, 2005; Kuhn, 2009). Often times the media can play a role in this as well, by
repeating the government vocabularies as well as adding to them.
Cultural identity is an important thing to many individuals. However, this identity
can go to extremes when the language is pitted against those who have newly arrived
within the country. This idea of “higher loyalties” is a part of this vocabulary that
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Matthews and Miller (2001) refer to. The rhetoric of “Real Australians,” “British
values,” “German Identity,” and “fighting for national identity” were also used by
Presidents and Prime Minsters to distance the majority population from refugees and to
harm the reputations of refugees outside the border (Dyrenfurth, 2005, Schonwalder,
1999, Schuster & Solomos, 1999). The UK government stated that criminal sanctions
were necessary to stop migrants from abusing the system which lumps refugees into the
criminal element (Bosworth & Guild, 2008). All of these terms help the government to
“other” the refugees from “real” citizens, deny them as a victim, frame them as illegal,
and make them less human in the eyes of the public. This could cause direct harms to
refugees. The idea of citizenship is used to create a competing dichotomy of citizens
versus non-citizens. Another of the vocabularies used by government is neutralization
through language. By using terms like “streamlining” and “managing,” Bosworth &
Guild (2008) argue refugees could be seen as a bureaucratic shuffling which may avoid
the issues surrounding migration.
Another specific example of “denial of harms” is Australia’s Tampa Incident. The
Tampa Incident involved the rescuing of a sinking boat of mostly Afghan refugees by a
Norwegian ship, the MV Tampa on August 26th, 2001 (Burnside, 2002). When the ship
attempted to take the refugees to Christmas Island for processing, the Australian
government would not allow the disembarkation of the refugees and instead routed them
to the neighboring island of Nauru where Australia had set up a refugee detention center
(Edwards, 2003; Kneebone, 2006). Australian Defense Minister Reith linked the Tampa
13

Incident with the September 11th attacks in the U.S., stating that the refugees could be
terrorists and that is why the refugees were not allowed to land on Australian soil (Perera,
2002). Although the UNHCR originally said they would assist in processing the
“rescuees” from the Tampa, they refused to do so for Australia in protest to the Pacific
Solution (Ryan & Mitsilegas, 2010).
In the same year as the Tampa incident, on October 19, 2001, the SIEVX
(Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel - Unknown) sank off of the coast of Christmas Island
resulting in the deaths of 353 people. The Howard government claimed to have no
knowledge of the incident (sievx.com, n.d.). This, coupled with the Tampa incident,
brought the issue of refugees arriving by boat to the forefront of the public’s view. Weber
(2007) brought up the words of diplomat Tony Kevin, who pointed his finger directly at
the AFP and the Australian government, stating that the SEIVX was sunk as part of the
strategy to disrupt people smuggling in cahoots with the Indonesia National Police. The
failure of a timely rescue by the government further enforced this argument (Weber,
2007).
The media also plays a role in the vocabularies surrounding refugees. During the
Tampa Incident, newspapers stated that only seven people were found to be refugees on
that ship. However, it later came out that 77% had been accepted as refugees (Maclellan,
2002). ABC radio hosts and newspapers, such as the Sun Herold, have also used terms
like “backdoor people,” “gate crashers,” and “queue jumpers” to describe refugees
(Gelber, 2003). These types of terms could dehumanize and stereotype refugees, helping
14

to label them as the “other.” In a study of public opinions on refugees, it was found that
people were only concerned about immigration when media campaigns that focus on the
topic are occurring (Jupp, 1995). This indicates that the public could be swayed by the
way the media which is often repeating the vernacular and standing of the government.
The victims being blamed for their own suffering is the third proposition of state
crime victimology (Matthews and Miller, 2001). If individuals at the border are framed as
migrants who are moving based solely on the premise of a better life, it is easy to
understand why they are viewed as causing their own problem. However, many of those
individuals may be refugees who have no choice but to flee their country. Boundary
enforcement with a human rights agenda would not place migrants in potentially
dangerous situations (Nevins, 2003). The governments of the EU and Australia may be
committing state crime based on how they use misdirection to blame refugees, harden the
border, then blame the refugees for their own injuries or deaths.
For example, the Australian government may have used misdirection to blame
refugees during the Tampa Incident. Prime Minister Howard and Defense Minister Reith
would not allow the media to cover the story, including banning photos or interviews
with the refugees, essentially censuring the situation (Burnside, 2002). The Howard
government blamed the refugees for their situation and framed them as economicallydriven, diseased, uneducated, terrorists and the deviant other (Jamieson & McKevoy,
2005; Pickering, 2005).
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Another example where the government may have used blame and misdirection is
of the so-called “children overboard” story that ran during the 2001 election. The Prime
Minister John Howard said that children were being thrown overboard by refugees to
blackmail the Navy into allowing them to land. Pictures of children in life vests in the
ocean were shown to the public. It came out later, however, that no refugee had thrown
their child overboard and the pictures were actually taken after the boat had sunk
(Maclellan, 2002). Additionally, a story by another government official stated there was
documented evidence that refugees were threatening to strangle their children to keep the
Navy from boarding their ship. This also later turned out to be false (Maclellan, 2002).
The EU government takes a position that refugees should not try to cross the
border by boat in order to stay safe from harm (Schuster & Solomos, 1999). On the
surface, this may seem like rational advice to those who have a choice about migration.
Why would anyone who knew the dangers that lie ahead of them, attempt a dangerous
journey? Many irregular border-crossers, specifically refugees, may not feel they have a
choice about leaving. The government uses this idea of rational thought to blame the
refugees for harm that comes to them when they try to cross the hardened border.
Migrants attempting to travel into southern Europe find high fences, advanced
technology, and intense border patrol which has lead to the deaths of those who try to
enter (Scapellino, 2007). Klepp (2010) notes that the number of drownings nearly
doubled in 2007 and more than 551 people were reported missing that year in the
Mediterranean due to migrants attempting to use smaller boats which are less likely to be
16

detected by border patrols. The EU’s argument that refugees should not cross the border
if they want to stay safe, may suggest a blaming of the victims for their own suffering.
Matthew and Miller’s (2001) fourth proposition of state crime victimology is that
victims must rely on the victimizer for recourse. This means refugees, who may already
be victims of state crimes, seeking justice may have to look to those parties that do not
have their best interests in mind. This is further bolstered by Jamieson and McEvoy’s
(2005) research that describes the idea of judicial “othering” in response to stateorganized crime. This judicial “othering” allows the government to use language and
laws to perpetrate acts that violate human rights. Jamieson and McEvoy (2005) describe
how using the difference between citizens and refugees places the victims of stateorganized crime away from national laws and jurisdiction.
Governments have the right to make laws as they choose because of their
sovereignty. However, when these laws tread on international obligations, a balance must
be met to protect human rights and the state’s right to laws. In some cases, the actions of
governments may jeopardize the rights of the individual. A particular example that may
help to illuminate this point for Australia’s refugees and judicial “othering” is case
brought against the government. A group of attorneys decided to bring a case against the
government about refugee rights in the Tampa incident where the judge that ruled in
favor of the refugees. The Australian government, under the advice of Immigration
Minister Ruddock, then passed the Migration Amendment Act which officials made
retroactive that criminalized the refugees by making it illegal to not have a visa within
17

Australia. The refugees were forced to leave the country (Pickering, 2005). This means
that refugees may have not been allowed justice and may be forced to rely on their
victimizer for assistance in receiving rights.
Detention centers are another issue that causes controversy in immigration policy.
Many citizens would be able to understand that the government needs somewhere to
house migrants while claims for legal status are process. However, this could be another
issue that falls under the fourth proposition of victims having to rely on their victimizer
for protection, specifically in the Australian creation of detention centers. In 1991, the
first group of refugees (Indo-Chinese) who arrived by boat were detained in newly built
detention centers. In 1992, this practice was broadened by mandating detention for all
“unlawful non-citizens” with no limit on the amount of time that one could be held
(York, 2003). The amount of time a refugee is detained in Australia is based on how long
it takes to process a refugee application, usually an average of two years (York, 2003).
While refugees were in the detention center waiting for their claim to be processed in the
new excised zone, he or she was prohibited from legal proceedings to challenge detention
(Kneebone, 2006). Additionally, these unlawful arrivals were unable to take legal action
in Australian courts and could not apply for a visa (York, 2003). Essentially, the refugees
looking for recourse against these actions have to rely on government agencies and the
courts for recourse.
In the EU refugees must also look for recourse from the government. In 1993 and
1996, the UK government, under Prime Minister Michael Howard, passed two acts
18

whose purpose was to reduce the number of refugee applicants and likely limited rights
of recourse. The acts limited who could claim asylum, made provisions for speedy
removal after claim denial, limited the numbers of admissible claims, and removed
welfare, housing, and child benefits for those refugees who did not apply for status within
3 days of being in the UK (Schuster & Solomos, 1999). In the same year that the UK was
tightening its borders, so was Germany. In 1993, Article 16 was passed which made
expulsion easier, reduced refugee appeals, and made a list of countries where persecution
was non-existent which meant that all application for refugee status from those countries
(some examples: Gambia, Ghana, and Romania) was not allowed (Schonwalder, 1996).
The Germans managed to reduce the number of claims for asylum from 400,000 in 1992
to 127,000 in 1994 (Schonwalder, 1996). Not only were governments reducing the
number of claims, but limiting the recourses refugees had from who could be considered
their victimizers.
The last proposition put forth by Matthews and Miller (2001) is that victims of
state crime may be easy targets for continued victimization. This means refugees who
may have been victimized already by the state may find themselves the victim of
additional crimes by the state. Australia’s use of Temporary Protection Visas, detention
centers, and the EU’s Dublin Regulation may be examples of this continued
victimization.
The importance of state sovereignty and its ability to make laws is important, as
discussed earlier. To deal with refugee issues, governments might pass laws to control
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length of stay, family reunification, or travel restrictions. Despite this important right,
disparity in treatment of refugees may constitute a breach of international law and what
could be viewed as continued victimization. Australia’s Temporary Protection Visas
(TPV) are issued to refugees after the Pacific Solution was put into place. Before the TPV
was put into place, all refugees were given permanent status (York, 2003). The TPV
divided refugees into two categories, either permanent or temporary. Permanent visas are
issued to those who have a valid visa and who later claim asylum. Alternatively, refugees
who arrive in excised Australian territories without authorization (already held for
lengthy time in detention centers with no legal recourse) are only offered temporary visas
(Edwards, 2003). These TPVs have shorter lengths of stay (three years), allow no re-entry
or travel outside of Australia and no family reunification (Gelber, 2003). In 2008, the
Australian government abolished TPVs at the urging of United Nations and multiple
NGOs and began granting permanent visas to all refugees. Nevertheless, the recent rise in
the number of people who arrive by boat has caused the public and some government
officials to suggest that the TPVs be reinstated to curb arrivals. The Australian
government is currently attempting to bring back TPV status for those who are convicted
of criminal activity while in detention camps (Interview with Immigration Minister Chris
Bowen, April of 2011).
As discussed, refugees are held for indeterminate amounts of time in detention
centers. The quality of the facility’s health care (mental and physical), living spaces and
sanitary conditions are of utmost importance, especially because the sheer number of
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refugees with Post-Tramatic Stress Disorder (Bilboe, 2007; Momartin, Silvoe,
Manicavasagar, & Steel, 2003; Silvoe, Austin, &Steel, 2007). The conditions of camps
have been explained, at their best, as “jail-like” and at their worst as “totally
unacceptable” (Bilboe, 2007; Silvoe, Austin, & Steel, 2007). In an affidavit by an Iranian
refugee who spent nine years in a Pakistani detention camp, she described the Australian
detention centers as having much worse conditions (Burnside, 2002). Despite the
condition of the immigrant detention facilities, refugees are given a bill for $147.50 per
day for the accommodation which means that someone who is detained for 2 years (the
average length of stay) must pay $100,000 upon their release (Burnside, 2002). Not only
are the refugees detained in terrible conditions, possible a crime in and of itself, they are
then billed for that service by the government.
In order to attempt to streamline the refugee process, the European Union passed
the Dublin Regulation with enforcement beginning in 2003 which stated refugees must be
processed in the country of first arrival. While at first glance, this law would seem to do
make sense, it has instead unbalanced the processing of migrants and may have lead to
continued victimization of migrants. This regulation was based on a fear of so-called
“economic migrants” going to a country which was more lenient in granting asylum
claims. This forces the burden of asylum applications to a few countries, including
Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Italy (Brady, 2008). The Dublin regulation significantly
slows the process of application processing. Refugees are not allowed to work while they
are waiting for their claim to process and most European countries have significantly
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reduced their welfare to those people without permanent status. That means while people
are waiting for their application to be processed by these few overwhelmed countries
(sometimes waiting over a year), the refugees are also kept in poverty and in some
countries detention centers in remote areas of Europe (Brady, 2008).
Utilizing Matthew and Miller’s (2001) theory of state crime victims, Australian
and EU practices and polices are examined through a lens of state crime. Refugees,
arguably the victims of state crime, have been discussed by many authors; however, none
have focused particularly on the details of victims and the harms that are caused to them.
Using a critical state-crime perspective, this study investigates refugee deaths along the
Australian and European Union Borders. Careful attention is given to determine the
demographic characteristics of those refugees who perish along the borders in an effort to
determine whether certain groups, such as women and certain ethnic groups, more
frequently die in comparison to other groups.
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Chapter Three: Methods
Data and Procedure
Data were derived from two secondary sources. First, records compiled by the
organization United for Intercultural Action (UNITED), a European network of NGOs
working to combat nationalism, racism, and fascism to support migrants and refugees,
were analyzed. Second, the Weber and Pickering (2011) database on Australian borderrelated deaths was also sourced. Taken together, these databases formed a quantitative
picture of border deaths at major border sites which have been subject to heightened
levels of enforcement. These data were compiled under the ARC Future Fellowship
Grant entitled “Policing the border: Security, human rights, and gender.”
It is important to recognize that there is no official national or regional count of
border-related deaths in Europe or Australia. Therefore, these datasets have been used to
explore the characteristics and dynamics of border deaths in Australia and the EU with a
focus on the disproportionate deaths of women and those from disadvantaged areas
origin. According to the United Nations (UN) developing regions are those most likely to
contain disadvantaged countries and include areas such as Africa, Oceania without
Australia, and Asia except for Japan (UN.org, 2011). Disadvantaged countries are
defined as those considered “developing” by the United Nations, characterized by
citizens in poverty with limited access to natural resources, economic opportunities, and
where basic needs such as sanitation, running water, food, and healthcare are not met for
the average person. The United Nations defines their list of developing countries by three
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criteria: (1) per capita gross national income, (2) human assets index (including nutrition,
health, and education for adults and children), and (3) economic vulnerability index
(including population, remoteness, merchandise export concentration, instability of
exports, victims of natural disasters, etc.) (UN.org/eng, n.d.).
Europe
To compile the data on border deaths in the EU, data gathered by UNITED (2011)
from 1993 to 2011 from news sources, government reports, shadow reports, newsletters,
news bulletins and documents produced by NGOs, blogs, testimonies, and media
monitoring was combined to create a deaths database (N = 14,037). UNITED is a
network of non-governmental organizations founded in 1992 and located in Amsterdam.
Comprised of over 560 NGOs, their goal is to raise awareness on several issues including
anti-nationalism, anti-racism, anti-fascism, and support of migrants and refugees.
UNITED gathers information from its organizations who work in the field of refugee and
migrants’ protection in Europe. These include NGOs, research institutes, journalists,
government organizations, and film-makers. The list of deaths includes refugees, asylum
seekers, and undocumented migrants whose death fits into as least one of the following
categories: (1) death has occurred during a border-crossing journey from outside Europe
into Europe in relation to asylum or refugee status; (2) death has occurred within a
detention centre, a refugee centre or shelter, or any other property designated to host
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers by public authorities; (3) death has occurred on
the public soil of any European country during a police raid, a border control activity, or
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a public investigation aimed at penalizing the presence of ‘illegally’ residing people; (4)
death has occurred during deportation procedures; (5) death has occurred outside Europe
after deportation and it is directly linked to the risk that pushed that individual to flee
his/her country in the first place; (6) death has occurred as a direct consequence of a
racist attack that has been perpetrated by a public officer, directly encouraged by him/her,
or purposely ignored by him/her; death has occurred during a human trafficking action;
(7) death has occurred as a consequence of neglect or ignored pleas for help or
medical/psychological/security assistance by undocumented migrants, refugees and
asylum seekers by any public officer or medical staff; (8) death has occurred as a direct
consequence of a serious episode of institutional racism perpetrated against an
undocumented migrant, refugee or asylum seeker; and (9) death that occurred in any of
the above situations, but in a non-European country that acts directly on behalf of
European immigration policies in accordance with such an agreement
(unitedagainstracism.org, n.d.)
Data were collected on gender (male, female, unknown), pregnancy status
(yes/no), region of origin (Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Indian Continent/Asia, South/Central America, other, unknown) and the
decedent’s cause of death (arson attack, car accident, drowned/reportedly
drowned/missing at sea, exposure/starvation/thirst/suffocation, minefield,
murder/manslaughter/execution, flee/fear/terrified, suicide, missing, no medical
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treatment, poisoned, or unknown). Additionally, information was gathered on whether the
migrant died while crossing the border (yes, no).

Australia
The Australian data came from Weber and Pickering’s (2011) database. They
collected data on deaths (N = 676) recorded from 2001 to 2010. In Australia, there is only
one source of information on border-related deaths at this time: the website SIEVX.com.
These data were collected by a group of concerned individuals, which formed largely in
response to the sinking of the SIEV-X on October 19, 2001. The aim of the people who
maintain the website has been in capturing the names and demographics of the dead,
details of their death, and photos of the families involved using primary (from survivors
and their families) and secondary data (from media and government reports).
Data were collected on gender (male, female, unknown), the death site (border
crossing point, borderlands, en route, offshore detention, onshore detention, labor
exploitation, hate crime, in destination/host country suicide/destitution, during
apprehension/deportation, upon return), year of death, and the region of origin (Eastern
Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Indian Continent/Asia,
South/Central America, Western Europe, unknown). Information was also gathered on
the cause of death (drowning, exposure, asphyxiation, starvation, violence, accident,
suicide, chased by authorities, lack of medical care, medical condition, unknown).
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Chapter Four: Results
One of the first commonalities noticed when analysing the data is that the
identities and characteristics of many of those who die remain unknown. Table 1 shows
that when examining the EU data at the base level of gender, the dead were about 15%
male (n = 2,077), 4% female (n = 496), and 80% were unknown (n = 11,464). For the
Australian dataset, the dead were about 15% male (n = 108), 12% female (n = 84), and
70% unknown (n = 484). In order to get a closer view of gender and deaths, two
particular incidents of similar size were examined for Australia and the EU. In examining
the data on deaths on the SIEV X in particular (the 2001 incident involving one ship
sinking off the coast of Australia), 12.7% (n = 45) were men, whereas 17.8% (n = 63)
were women and 69.4% (n = 245) were missing. Looking at a disaster of similar size for
the data regarding the EU, three boats sank off of Tripoli on same date in 2009 with 300
people reported missing. Of those identified from the 300, 69 (about 23%) were female.
These missing data on gender demonstrate the lack of even partial data on those who die
while crossing borders.
Age of those who die while trying to cross the border is another area obscured by
missing and partial data (see Table 1). For the EU, about 18% (n = 2,565) were over the
age of eighteen, while about 4% (n = 556) were under eighteen. The average age of death
was twenty-five years. However, missing data comprise almost three-quarters of cases (n
= 10,916). For the Australian data, 8% (n = 54) were over 18 and about 9% (n = 60) were
under eighteen, and the average age of death was 20. However, once again the missing
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data was over 80% (n=562). In order to get a closer view of age and deaths, two
particular incidents of similar size were examined for Australia and the EU. In examining
the data on deaths on the SIEV X incident from Australia, about 16% (n = 55) were under
18, whereas 6.6% (n=24) were over eighteen and over three-quarters (n = 274) were
missing. Looking at disaster of similar size for the data regarding the EU, less than 1% (n
= 2) were under 18, whereas about a quarter (n = 69) were over eighteen and again three
quarters (n = 230) were missing.
Table 1. Gender and Age of Recorded Border Deaths
European Union
%
n

Australia
%

n

Gender

Male

14.8

2,077

16.0

108

Female

3.5

496

12.4

84

Missing

81.7

11,464

71.6

484

Age

Adult

18.3

2,565

8.9

54

Minor

3.9

556

8.0

60

77.8

10,916

83.1

562

Missing

Looking to Table 2 and the areas of origin for deaths in the EU, Africans, at over
half, (n = 7,792) were those who most frequently died border crossing. North African
regions were cited in about 40% (n = 5,295) of deaths and Sub-Saharan Africa in about
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18% (n = 2,497). The third highest area of origin for deaths was the Middle East with
about 8% (n = 1,159). The lowest rates of death for crossing the border into the EU were
South/Central America at less than one percent (n = 47). Although a smaller portion of
data is absent in this analyses, there is still almost 25% (n=3,516) missing.
In Australia the area of origin with the highest percentage of deaths was the
Middle East with nearly 80% (n = 519), followed by the Indian Subcontinent/Asia with
20% (n = 135). The area of origin with the lowest frequency of death from crossing the
border to Australia include both Eastern Europe (n = 1) and Sub-Saharan Africa (n = 1)
with both at less than 1%. The region of origin category for the Australia dataset has a
low rate of missing data at less than .7 percent.
Table 2. Region of Origin Cited Among Border Deaths
European Union
%
n

Australia
%

n

Eastern Europe

6.3

887

.1

1

Indian Subcontinent/Asia

4.5

636

20.0

135

Middle East

8.3

1,159

76.8

519

North Africa

37.7

5,295

0

0

.3

47

0

0

17.8

2,497

.1

1

0

0

.3

2

25.0

3,516

.7

5

South/Central America
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
Missing
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Because these datasets cover a very broad definition of border deaths, specifics as
to whether someone died crossing the border or in the borderlands was examined. For the
EU data, nearly 95% (n = 13,182) died while crossing the border, with no missing data in
this variable. Similarly, the Australian data reflected that nearly 95% died while crossing
the border (n = 636), also with no missing data (see Table 3).
Table 3. Died Crossing the Border

Yes
No
Missing

European Union
%
n

Australia
%

n

93.9

13,182

94.1

636

6.1

855

5.9

40

0

0

0

0

When looking closer at the causes of death, the data showed the leading cause for
both the EU and Australia was drowning: the EU at over 80% (n = 11,583) and Australia
at over 90% (n = 629; see Table 4). The second highest percentage for the EU was lack of
medical treatment at about 3% (n = 331). Australia’s second most frequent cause were
both suicide and violence, both at less than 2% (n = 11). The EU had 9.5% (n = 1,332) of
cases missing and Australia had less than 2% (n = 11). When reviewing a crosstabs
analysis between border deaths and cause of death for the EU, about 96% of deaths in the
borderlands resulted from drowning (n=11,521). For Australia, almost 100% (n=629) of
those who died in the borderlands did so due to drowning. About 10% (n=1,332) for the
EU and less than 2% (n=11) for Australia had missing data for this test.

30

Table 4. Cause of Death
European Union
%
n

Australia
%

n

Accident

0

0

.1

1

Arson Attack

.3

47

0

0

Car Accident

1.2

174

0

0

0

0

.3

2

82.6

11,583

93.0

629

Frozen

.7

93

0

0

Medical Condition

0

0

1.2

8

1.5

212

0

0

Murder/Manslaughter

.4

61

1.6

11

No Medical Treatment

2.4

331

.4

3

Poisoned

.9

130

0

0

Starvation/Thirst

.4

52

0

0

Suffocate

.2

22

0

0

Suicide

0

0

1.6

11

Missing

9.5

1,332

1.6

11

Chased by Authorities
Drowned/Rpt. Drowned

Minefield

Crosstab tests on the European Union data comparing dying in the borderlands
and area of origin showed that Africans had the highest numbers of death with more than
three quarters of all deaths in the borderlands: North Africans were about half (n=5,019)
and Sub-Saharan Africans about one-quarter (n=2,383) of all deaths. North Africans were
also most likely to die not in the borderlands, as well at 36% (n=276), followed by

31

Eastern Europeans at about 20% (n=155). The percentage of missing data for this
crosstabs was about 25 percent (n=3,516; see Table 5). When running these same tests for
the Australian data, again between dying in the borderlands and area of origin, those from
the Middle East had the highest number of deaths at 80% (n= 510), followed by those
from the Indian Subcontinent/Asia at about 20% (n=122). For those who died while not
in the borderlands, the Indian Subcontinent/Asia had the highest percentage at about 40%
(n=13). The percentage of missing data for this crosstabs was less than one percent (n=5).
Also refer to Figure 1 which gives a visual interpretation of these statistics.
Table 5. Region of Origin and Border Deaths
Died Crossing the Border
European Union
Australia
Yes
No
Yes
No
%
n
%
n
%
n
%
n
Region of Origin

Eastern Europe

7.4

732

19.9

155

0

0

3.7

1

Indian Subcont./Asia

5.9

573

8.2

63

19.2

122

46.3

13

Middle East

10.5

1,029

16.7

130

80.3

510

32.1

9

North Africa

51.6

5,019

35.6

276

0

0

0

0

.09

9

4.9

38

.5

3

7.1

2

24.6

2383

14.7

114

0

0

3.7

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

7.1

2

South/Central America
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe

European Union
Missing

Australia

%

n

%

n

25

3,516

0.7

5
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Figure 1. Region of Origin Cited Among Border Deaths

Grouping of deaths are also interesting to examine. The EU numbers did not push
past the 1,000 mark until 2003 (n=1,302) and was at its highest in 2006 (n=2,000). The
two spikes in Australian deaths (2001 and 2010) relate to two specific sinking of ships:
the SIEV X (53.8%; n=364) and the Christmas Island shipwreck (23.1%; n=156). See
Figures 1 and 2 for full layouts of deaths by year.
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Figure 2. European Union Deaths by Year
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Chapter Five: Discussion
The focus of this thesis was to examine the demographic characteristics of those
refugees who perish along the borders in an effort to determine whether certain groups,
such as women and certain ethnic groups, more frequently die in comparison to other
groups. The counting and categorizing of refugees, in and of itself, is a difficult task
(Pickering, 2011). This is further complicated by the struggle to count deaths in the wake
of disasters, such as shipwrecks (Quarantelli, 2001). Trying to get a closer look at the
demographics of those refugees who have died, through the filter of NGO data, has also
proved challenging.
As one can see from the data analysis, much of even the most basic data are
missing for those refugees who perished, especially in the areas of gender and age.
Around 80% of the data on gender and age were missing in both the EU and Australian
datasets. These missing data preclude an analysis for further understanding of the most
basic information on these refugee deaths. For example, crosstabs tests comparing age
and gender would have been important to receive a clear understanding of the
demographics of this data set. Since so much of the data are missing, there is no way to
garner this information.
Women have long been socially marginalized in this world. This is often triply
true of refugee women who lack status based on gender, race, and class. This
marginalization is especially prevalent during crisis situations (Chandra, et al. 2009).
Women’s labor in third world countries in areas such as agriculture and informal sectors
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has often been undervalued, but even beyond that women often remain uncounted and
unknown (Corner, 2009; Drake, 1983; Ludher, 1995). Harms to women and girls during
times of war have also long been overlooked when examining the official cost of war
(Hynes, 2004). This idea of women as often the unknown and missing may relate to data
at hand.
Given what has been seen in other research, women are likely at a survival
disadvantage during migration. UNICEF studies across Asia have consistently shown that
in the case of drowning, while men regularly outnumber women, in terms of exposure to
potential drowning situations women are at a survival disadvantage (Linnan, 2011). This
is partly because in developing countries women typically swim at half the speed of men,
which is likely a side effect of gender roles (Linnan, 2011). Moreover, in these
developing countries women of reproductive age often have young children in their care,
further placing them at a disadvantage in dangerous situations. In a recent study
conducted in Indonesia following the 2004 Tsunami, researchers found that of people in
villages who had been killed, most were either very young or very old, with one
exception: women who were caring for a young child (Doocy et al., 2007). Even more
significant is that women with two or more children had the lowest survival rates of all-no women with more than one child survived the disaster (Doocy et al., 2007). While
most research in the developing world on drowning has been carried out in Asia, these
patterns are likely similar for people from the Middle East and Africa, which has led
epidemiologists to conclude that a similar picture can reasonably be formed in relation to
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the countries of origin of asylum seekers arriving by boat (Linnan, 2011). In short,
women who irregularly cross borders by boat, especially those travelling with children,
face a survival disadvantage relative to men and may likely make up many of those in the
missing category of gender.
Globally there are no governmental or official sources of data regarding borderrelated deaths. These types of deaths often remain unrecorded and unrecognized by
nation states and international organizations. Researchers instead must rely on
information from news outlets or NGOs where the quality and quantity of information
available is often limited. Arguably, these organizations are important resources for
advancing the study of harms at the border with the data that they collect, but beyond that
it is necessary to collect detailed information on this topic in an international database by
governments and other interested parties, such as the United Nations High Council on
Refugees (UNHCR). A strong database of these deaths will serve to better document the
human cost and demographics of irregular border crossing, as well identifying the
commonalities and differences between border zones and the relationship between border
crossing and border hardening practices. Beyond that are the fundamental ideas of human
rights and budgetary concerns from the public and the government about the cost of
border hardening.
Under international law itself, there are few protections for the individual,
including right against discrimination, right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life,
and the right not to be tortured or killed via genocide (Hathaway, 2005). However,
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Australia and the EU ensured additional rights to refugees beyond those basics by signing
the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as the 1967 Protocol. The Convention guarantees
the rights of refugees in international law. The main rights allotted to refugees when they
come under a state’s jurisdiction, even by conservative scholars, are non-refoulment and
non-discrimination (Hathaway, 2005). Keeping track of border deaths will allow
governments to be able to point to specific actions that may be contributing to these
deaths and point to potential methods of curtailing them in order to hold up their
international obligations.
Budgeting and monetary issues also play a large part in concerns surrounding
border hardening and refugees for both the public and governmental bodies.
Governments are spending large amounts of their budgets to deter refugees from trying to
enter their borders. However, when researchers looked at this border hardening along the
US-Mexico border, they found that this myth of deterrence, in the form of enhanced
border patrols, did not lessen migration, but instead forced migrants to rely on expensive
smugglers to assist them across difficult to traverse borders (Purcell & Nevins, 2005).
Weber (2007) argues that deterrence can only be effective for people who have a choice
about their migration. This is not the case with refugees who are fleeing a state of terror
and violence. Therefore, the militarization of borders and the target hardening of easier
entry ports are not effective in deterring migration (Nevins, 2003). In the 2009-2010
immigration budget, Australia invested approximately 170 million AUD just on the
single aspect of border protection. The numbers of those trying to enter Australia has not
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lessened with the large expense and effort put into border hardening. They received about
8,580 refugee applications in 2010, an increase of 31% over 2009 (UNHCR.org, 2011).
The consequences of border hardening need to be closely reviewed by the
Australian and EU governments enforcing it. As examined in the results section, many of
the victims of border hardening remain not only nameless, but completely unknown. The
policies being put into place to harden the border may be leading to more deaths. When
looking to where these deaths are occurring, for both the EU and Australia, over 90% for
both data sets died crossing the border or in the borderlands. This means deaths which
happened while a person was attempting to cross the border or making way to a border.
The other deaths included in this data set enumerate deaths like those that occur in
detention centers or within borders.
Examining the causes of deaths in this data set, drowning was easily the most
common cause of death at over 80% for the EU and over 90% for Australia. The
secondary causes of death are both at less than 3%. Theses data, in concert with the data
in the previous paragraph, likely indicates most deaths happen at sea while people are
attempting to cross or get to the border. Understanding where and how these refugees are
dying is critical, otherwise these deaths remain easier to ignore and harder to identify.
The information is vital to human rights’ organizations and governments to determine
where the biggest dangers are for refugees fleeing to what they hope will be safety.
The largest jump in deaths in the data set for the European Union was from 2005
to 2006. In 2005, the death count was at 922 people, but in 2006, the number jumped to
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almost double with the highest accounting of deaths from the dataset at 2,000 people.
This may have a link to above-described FRONTEX, the border patrol agency for the
EU. It originated in 2005 and began its work in the field in 2006 (Lutterbeck, 2008).
These deaths might possibly be caused from FRONTEX’s practice of turning away ships
to their point of origin, often with no consideration to the seaworthiness of vessels. The
big jumps in the Australian data are all related to disasters at sea. In 2001, the SEIV X
sank killing 364 people in international waters with the so-called Australian aerial border
protection surveillance zone. The Australian government takes no action and the
survivors are saved by an Indonesian fishing boat. 2001 was also the beginning of John
Howard’s Pacific Solution in response to the August Tampa incident. This border
hardening policy may have affected the response of Australian border police to this
incident leading to more death due to a long-delayed rescue from farther off Indonesia.
Hatton and Williamson (2006) name several reasons that refugees leave their
countries of origin. The authors found that the main reason for movement was war and
violence. Casteles and Loughna (2003) also found the biggest factor in migration was
conflict, especially when it involves repression of minorities and ethnic conflict. These
authors also explain how the largest factor in where a refugee determines to go is
geographic proximity. However, other factors such as strong colonial links between
Africa and Europe, common language, existing ethnic community, smugglers choosing
the destination, past guestworker programs, direct plane flights, and economic incentives
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help texturize the migration to a new destination (Castles & Loughna, 2003; Hatton &
Williamson, 2006).
Hoffman (2010), in a qualitative study, looks at why Iraqis end up in Australia—
Often times they first head to nearby countries such as Jordan and Syria, where again
they had to move on due to lack of safety due to the Iraqi regime and intelligence. Next
the refugees ended up in Malaysia (relatively safe for a short time due to two-week visas
to promote tourism issued to Arabs at the airport) then to Indonesia, neither country a
signer of the Refugee Convention meaning that their were no protections or rights for
individuals. The refugees then headed to Australia by boat to claim asylum. Australia
gave them rights to safety, the ability to work to feed their families, and education for
their children (Hoffman, 2010).
Another consequence may be that refugees from certain areas of origin are being
adversely affected by border hardening. In sheer numbers, those who come from Africa
are dying in the greatest amounts in relation to the EU, while those from Middle Eastern
countries are most likely to die in relation to Australia. Looking at the results between
area of origin and dying crossing the border, the EU and Australian data may reveal that
groups facing the greatest likelihood of dying at or near the border come from these same
countries, notably African countries for the EU (75%) and Middle Eastern countries for
Australia (80%), that are also most likely rejected for lawful entry due to being from
“risky” countries based on risk assessment made by these states. The results of these data
may also indicate people of certain ethnic origins are being funneled into these more
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dangerous crossings, as they do not have equal access to this legal entry. For example,
Australia gave out more protection visas to Yugoslavian and Bosnian refugees, both
European and white, than any other group in the recent past and upped the humanitarian
quota to accept more of this group in the future in the face of civil war occurring there
(Colic-Peisker, 2005). None of these same changes were made for Middle Eastern
countries during civil war and unrest periods.
Matthews and Miller (2001) have six propositions of victimology in regards to
state crime. They include victims not being socially powerful & stereotyped, that the
victimizer may dehumanize victims using special vocabulary and denial of harm, victims
are blamed for their own suffering, victims must rely on the victimizer for recourse, and
that victims are easy targets for continued victimization. This paper first looked at these
through the literature surrounding irregular-border crossers who are seeking entry into the
European Union and Australia. Results may support the idea that these victims are not
socially powerful, as many come from disadvantaged countries and may not have much
financial capital of their own.
Identifying and collecting information on refugees is the first step in determining
how these border hardening strategies may be affecting populations of people. The first
priority of the EU and Australian government should be the safety of these individuals.
As discussed above, refugees have been linked to terrorism and crime by governments
and the media. However, the government and the media may frame refugees and links to
terrorism, but there have been no instances of global terrorism connected to refugees
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(Adelman, 2002). There is also a perception held by the general public that migrants
cause a disproportionate amount of crime. Nevertheless, in a recent study of migrants and
crime, researchers in Italy found there was no causal link between immigration and the
overall crime rate (Bianchi, Buonanno, & Pinotti, 2010). Other researchers have come to
this same conclusion—finding immigrants are more law-abiding than those born natively
(Martinez, 2006; Rumbaurt and Ewing, 2007). In fact, Sampson (2006) suggests that the
drop in crime in the United States in the 1990s might be in part due to an influx of
immigrants into neighborhoods during that time. Immigrants are not a high crime risk.
Even when looking specifically at legal and illegal immigrants’ criminal recidivism, there
was no difference between the two groups (Hickman & Suttorp, 2008). This suggests that
the legal status of a person is likely not linked to crime rates.
The protections of refugees should be tantamount to unfounded concerns of
criminality by the government or the general public. This is especially true for those who
are attempting to enter via water, most of whom have no choice but to flee, but are often
faced with the dangers of leaky boats, overcrowding, poor swimming abilities, and
corrupt smugglers. Each migrant should be given the chance to have their plea for asylum
heard by a governmental body for validity, rather than facing the dangers of a hardened
border and a possible death at sea.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
White collar crime is understudied in criminological literature, despites its serious
harms, and this is especially true for state crime. State crime can come in many forms,
but many authors agree that one of the most egregious of these types breaks the basic
human rights guaranteed to citizens and non-citizens. The victims of state crime are often
not socially powerful, find themselves “othered” by governments and the media, blamed
for their own suffering, likely easy targets for continued victimization, given little
recourse for the crimes against them, and what recourse they may look for must come
from the state which was the one to perpetrate the crime in the first place.
The EU and Australia have multiple obligations to protect the refugee population,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1945 Refugee Convention.
However, they fail to meet these responsibilities by instituting border hardening practices
that have proven fatal for a number of those attempting to reach these areas. These border
hardening practices include heavier border policing, excisions of country territory,
refoulment, denial of visas for high risk countries, and offshore detention facilities. The
purpose of this study was to examine the demographics around the border deaths that
may occur from border hardening by the EU and Australia with a specific focus on
women and those from disadvantaged areas of origin.
As described in the results section, some conclusions could not even by drawn
from the data collected, due to the sheer amount of missing numbers in the areas of
gender and age. This, in and of itself, is an important finding. The lack of data present in
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these most basic areas indicates that this problem is not being properly documented and a
full picture cannot be drawn of those who die due to border hardening efforts. When
looking at areas of origin, the data are somewhat more complete. Many of the refugees
who come from what the United Nations would describe as developing areas, die more
frequently from drowning while in the borderlands. The other interesting result in this
dataset was how further border security, such as the introduction of FRONTEX and the
instating of the Pacific Solution, may be related to a rise in deaths. This relationship
should be examined further by future research to determine the exact connection between
policies and border deaths.
On the most basic levels, it is of great import to identify and collect information
on refugees to determine how these border hardening strategies may be affecting
populations of people. Without this information a complete picture of border deaths
cannot be examined. As suggested, an international database kept by governments and
other interested parties such as the UNHCR, would help two-fold: to identify information
on these individuals and, just as importantly, for governments and the public to recognize
this issue exists.
Beyond the essential act of collecting information via an international database, it
is necessary to change our way of thinking about refugees and migration. Although
governments and the public feel that securitization of the borders allows for a safer
country, the refugees who are looking for asylum are more likely to bring positive
qualities to the countries that accept them rather than the negative attributes often
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assigned to them. Refugees bring a richness of different cultures, a myriad of skill sets,
and an eagerness to build a better life for future generations. Beyond these benefits, it is
the duty of these countries to uphold their international obligations of human rights.
Furthermore, the millions of dollars that are currently being funnelled into border security
can instead be routed into programs and state-run agencies such as schooling and
healthcare that benefit both refugees and citizens alike.
Nevertheless, the question still lingers about whether the refugee situation can be
handled safely and legally in an efficient manner for states. Gibney (1999), who writes
about the case of Kosovo refugees and the world’s response, states that instead of
hardened borders and negative press from media, the refugees were instead welcomed.
The UK bypassed family reunification procedures, Australia increased the number of
humanitarian visas to this region, more funding was produced from the UNHCR ($1.23
per day as opposed to the .11 a day it spends on African refugees), and there was
immediate NATO action in the area. Gibney (1999) states how this “popular” refugee
status may have come from things like geographic closeness and cultural identity with the
refugees. If a more balanced effort was put forth by the international community for all
refugees, a more equal effect would likely be seen.
By hardening borders, based on unfounded fears and fabrication around security,
governments unjustly harm those who are at their most vulnerable. Multiple authors have
shown that this securitization does not keep migrants out, but instead likely leads to
further harms. It is imperative that the protection of people be of tantamount importance
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to governments. The views on refugees and migration need to change in this globalizing
planet to thinking of everyone as citizens of the world, rather than isolated regions with
hard arbitrary border lines placed to keep the unwanted out while the privileged move
with ease.
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